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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF U^AH

KIRK NELSON dba NELSON SHEET
METAL,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 14956
RICHARD WATTS dba RICHARD WATTS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and LEON CARVER,
Defendants and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT1

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF TljE CASE
This is an action to recover on an oral contract
for performance of work in construction of a federal building.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried before a jury.

Judgment was

granted for Plaintiff, here Respondent, in the amount of $1,678.18
without interest or attorney fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAll
Appellants seek a reversal ofl the judgment and a
dismissal of the Complaint as stating rjo cause ot action.
Costs should be awarded to Appellant.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In 1969f Appellant, Richard Watts, as general contractor,
accepted a contract to construct a building in Logan, Utah, known
as the Logan Armory Building.

To complete that construction, a

bid was accepted from Leon Carver, doing business as Leon Carver
Heating and Plumbing Company, to do the plumbing and heating
sub-contract work in the amount of $55,000.00.
Appellant required the above named subcontractor to
furnish a list of all subcontractors and suppliers used by him
because Appellant upon advise of his bonding company, was
concerned about Carver's financial ability.

(Tr. 41-42)

Kirk Nelson, Respondent, was not on the list submitted.
Then in August, 1969, Carver filed bankruptcy.

Respondent did

not file any lien against Appellant's bond or avail himself of
any relief afforded by law to suppliers.
Appellant made payments for services and materials
to those subcontractors from Carver's list as the work was
completed until May, 1970. At that time he received a bill
from Respondent made payable from Leon Carver and himself.
Upon receipt of the bill Appellant, through his secretary,
Dawn Draney, contacted various subcontractors and suppliers
of Leon Carver and found numerous other small bills incurred
by Carver without Appellant's knowledge.

By May, 1970, Appellant

nad paid Carver for almost all the work done, including the
duct work in question, and there was insufficient money retained
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by Appellant to pay the additional bil^s claimed on the part
of Respondent.
On May H, 1974, an action wa^ tiled by Respondent
against Appellant and beon Carver for the debt in question.
At trial, Respondent presented evidence that sometime in December,
1969, he had a conversation with Appellant, Appellant agreed
to be responsible for this work, thereby creating an oral contract
between the two parties.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE, AS A MATTE^ OF LAW, IS INSUFFICENT
TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT FOR RESPONDENT.

Appellant realizes the difficult task involved in
appealing a jury verdict against him.

Conceding this fact,

the undersigned assures the Court that this appeal is taken
with utmost seriousness for two reasons!

First, in considering

the testimony, the documentary evidence , and the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom, it is apparent that the verdict
is not supported by the facts.

Secondly, the effect of such

a verdict is to place such a heavy liabjility upon a general
contractor as to make it impossible to brotect himself in his
dealings with subcontractors and suppliers.

To avoid such

blatant injustice, Appellant feels compelled to present the
case to the Court to review the facts ajid applicable law as
set forth herein.
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Significantly, the only testimony to substantiate
Respondent's claim is the testimony of his relative, John Henry
Bott, and his own testimony,

on page 6 of the trial record,

Respondent contends that a conversation was held.
Q.

Did you have a conversation at that time with Mr.
Watts?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Could you tell us who was present at the time
this conversation took place?

A.

There was Mr. Watts, Mr. Carver, Mr. Bott and myself.

Q.

And could you tell us, if anything, what was said
during this conversation if you recall?

A.

Yes. The conversation was that I did not bid the
job, I didn't give Mr. Carver a bid on the job,
and that I knew for a fact that Mr. Carver
was in financial trouble and that I could not do
the job for him.

Q.

Okay.

And could you tell us what the conversation

was between you and Mr. Watts and Mr. Carver at
this time?
A.

Yes.

I told Mr. Watts that if I did the work I

would have to be doing it for him, that I didn't
feel that Mr. Carver could pay for it.
Q.

And could you tell us, if anything, what Mr. Watts
said to this?
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A,

Mr. Watts told me that hel was paying all the bills
and to get busy and get t|he job done and he would
see that it was paid for.

By his own admission, there was no agreled upon price for the job.
Q.

Okay.

Now you said at th|is time there was no

written contract ever drawn up or even tendered on
your part or written notice at all to Mr. Watts
about what it was going tp

cost to do the sheet

metal work?
A.

No.

I indicated to him that I hadn f t seen the plans

prior to this conversation, and I, of course,
couldn't give him the pripe at that time.
Q.

And was there any discussion at all about what
the price was going to be?

A.

T don't think so, no.

( T L 10, 1. 11-20)

further, Respondent's actions were not consistent with his claims.
O.

And you were going to be tied in with Mr. Carver,
isn't that correct; you wanted to protect yourself
in this job?

A.

I wanted to protect myself.

Q.

And still, you did not write any written notice or
letter at all confirming any agreement as to what
you understood the agreement with Mr. Watts would be?

A.

He, Mr. Watts, promised tcp pay, and that was enough
for me.

O.

^hat is how you recall th<i conversation?

A.

Uh-huh.

(Tr. 16 1. 13-23}
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This testimony is corroborated only by Bott, who,
upon direct examination, testified that he could remember only
a part of the conversation which took place among Watts, Carver,
and Nelson at the Armory in December, 19 69.
Q.

Okay, just relate what Mr, Watts said.

A.

Mr. Watts stated that he would pay the billing of

the time and material, and tnatfs the only thing tnat I
remember of it, sir.
Q. Was anything else said during this conversation that
you can recall?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

Where you present subsequently on any occasions while

Mr. Nelson was doing work on this Armory?
A.

No.

(Tr. 18, 1. 18-28)

It is indeed curious that the only words he could
remember from that day constitute the only corroborative evidence
offered by Respondent in the instant case.

Leon Carver, the

only other party to the conversation never heard Appellant
promise to pay Respondent for work done.

His account was that

a conversation began and he left subsequently.

(Tr. 21)

Appellant, while acknowledging that there could have
been conversations of a general nature, denies that he was
advised that Kirk Nelson was working with Carver, that he ever
assumed responsibility for any debt incurred by Kirk Nelson
and denies any conversation to that effect.

(Tr. 39,40)

In

fact, Appellant was not even aware that Respondent was on the
job until he appeared in Watts Construction Company offices
- 6 -

in May, 1970, with a bill in hand, for materials and services.
(Tr. 39, 1. ^427)
A perusal of the record demonstrates that Appellant,
on the advice of nis bonding company, took extra precautions
to protect the company from subcontractors who would not pay
their bills.

For example, the express purpose of Appellant's

requiring the itemized statements set forth as Exhibits No.
6 and No. 8 was to determine with whom Defendant Carver was
dealing.

(mr. 42)

According to the procedure, Appellants

company would then have a permanent record of parties involved.
Also, after Respondent came to his office in May, ly70 Appellant
directed his secretary to investigate qny further outstanding
bills and prepare a list of such bills incurred by Carver.
(Tr. 57)

This list confirms the very suspicions expressed

by the bonding company. (Defendants Exhibit #11)

Such diligence

on Appellant's part as shown by the record should not have
been rewarded with a judgment requiring! him to pav again for
work completed and already paid for by Appellant.
Another precaution taken by Appellant in the general
course of business is requiring any subcontractor to sign a
subcontract agreement when the company enters into such a relationsnip.

(Tr. 4J, 1. 14)

On redirect by Mr. Dorius in reference

to prior dealings, Appellant testified that on a previous occasion,
Respondent had done general sheet metal and mechanical work for
Appe11ant under a signed written subcontract agreement. 11
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is difficult to invent reasons why Appellant would not have
had Respondent sign a similar agreement if there had, in fact,
been one at all. No reasons are offered £>y Respondent.
Documentary evidence is in complete support of Anpellant's
position also.

^he Court will note that the two invoices designated

as Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1 and No. 2, dated March 7, 1970,
and May 16, 1970, consecutively, are both made out to Leon Carver,
the former even being sent to his address in Brigham City, Utah.
It is totally inconsistent with Respondent's allegation of an oral
contract in December, 1969, that he should wait until May, 19/0,
to bill Appellant, especially since he had billed Leon Carver
alone in March of 1970.

Further, Respondent had more than

ample opportunity to protect himself either 1) by requiring a
written contract, z)

by sending direct billings to Watts

as the work progressed, or 3) by filing action on a bond as
provided by U.C.A.

This litigation was also tiled against Mr.

Carver as a co-defendant.
Clearly, the preponderance of the evidence is against
the existence of any oral agreement.

To allow Respondent to wait

four years to file on an oral contract which, if it existed at
ail, was only in Respondent's imagination, is to place a heavy
burden on a contractor to guard against unfounded claims for
payment.

In effect, the verdict of the lower Court jury, not

being based on substantial evidence, contravenes the very
intention of the law's preterence for written agreements

—

to discourage parties from entering into vague or unenforceable
- 8 -

oral agreements in which ownersf contiractors and subcontractors
are unsure of their obligations.

Since the construction industry

is not well served by allowing such injustice to go unchecked,
the verdict should be overturned and Judgment of the lower ^ourt
be reversed.
II. ^HE LOJER COURT1 CORRECHLt PRESENTED THE LAW
TO ^HE J U R Y IN INSTRUCTION N(J). 4 ON m HE BURDEN
OF PROOF ON RESPONDENT.
Instruction No. 3 places the I burden of proving the
existence of a contract upon the Plaintiff - Respondent.
It states the following as elements which must be proved for
Respondent to prevail:

(l)

that there was a direct oral contrac

wherebv Plaintiff - Respondent was emploved by Appellant and
(2)

that an agreement to guarantee payment in the event of

Carvers default must be in writing unless the promise to
pay was made as part of the original employment contract.
Respondent proved neither of these elements as demonstrated
by the lack of substantial evidence to establish an oral contract
at all.

According to the record, Instruction No. 4 reads in part
That unless the truth of the allegation is proved by
a preponderance of the eviderice, you shall ^ind the
same not to be true.
The term "preponderance of tlie evidence means such
evidence as when weighed with that opposed to it, has
more convincing force, and tifom which it results that
the greater probability of truth lies therein.
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(^r. 61)

The function of this Instruction, as in any Instructions
on burden of proof, is to tell the jury how it should weigh the
evidence.
(1956).

In re Richard's Estate, 5 U. 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542, 544
It is then "the duty of the jury to be governed by the

instructions and when given they become the law of the case,
whether right or wrong."

Price v. Sinnett, 460 P. 2d 837,840

(Nev., 196y).
The Instruction No. 4 is correct on authority of
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16,268 P.2d 986 (1954) and Burnett
v. Reyes, 118 Cal, App. 2d Supp. 878,256 P.2d 91, 93. A "preponderance" means "The greater weight of the evidence, or as sometimes
stated, such degree of proof that the greater probability of truth
lies herein."

Alvarado, supra, at 988. However, it was clearly

not followed by the jury in light of the substantial testimonial
and documentary evidence in favor not of Respondent, but in favor
of Appellant as outlined above.

See point I.

III. DESPITE A GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO DO SO, THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT OVERTURNING ^HE VERDICT AS
BEING A MISCARRIAGE OP JUSTICE.
After a careful reading of the evidence presented, it
is apparent that the jury verdict is not supported by the facts
and

is strictly a sympathetic verdict rendered on a 3/4 basis

for Respondent.

To the contrary, there is substantial evidence

to support Appellant's denial of the alleged oral contract.
"A jury may not conjecture or speculate, but must have substantial
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evidence upon which to base a verdict.
139 P.2d 216, 220 (Utah, 1943).

Anderson v. Nixon,

See also Reynolds v. Strabie

128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P.2d 690 (1933).

Not even the outer

bounds of reason afford room to determine that the evidence
discussed above is in substantial suppprt of an oral contract as
alleged by Respondent.
There is ground for overturning a jury verdict such
as this "when it is plainly apparent that the jury has abused its
prerogatives by refusing to accept uncpntroverted credible evidenc
or otherwise ignoring or misapplying proven facts or established
law."

Lund v. Pnillips Petroleum Co.,1 351 P.2d 9b2,955 (Utah,

1960) and cases cited therein.

In this case, there is not even

equally strong evidence in support of Respondent's claim from
which the jury could have round as it aid.

Clearly the jury

ignored substantial evidence to the detriment of Appellant and
the verdict should have been overturned as a gross miscarriage
ot justice.
CONCLUSION
That the evidence by a preponderance is required for a
verdict in a civil case is correctly stated and given to the jury
in Instruction No. 4.

Although under a duty to adhere to such

dictates of law, the jury in this case|clearly disregarded its
mandate that a preponderance or substantial sufficiency ot evidenc
be the basis of its verdict.
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The preponderance of evidence does not show an agreement
was made between Appellant Richard Watts, and Respondent Kirk
Nelson in December, 1969, but reflects instead a self-serving
declaration by Respondent and a relative that he wanted to be
paid for work completed in the absence of any agreement with
Appellant.

Respondent aid not even attempt to protect himself

through any written agreement, periodic payment schedule, or
lien rights as provided by law.

To allow Respondent to wait

four years to file on an oral contract, the existence ot which
is not supported by the evidence, places a burden on the general
contractor far m

excess of what the law imposes.

For the

protection ot all parties involved and for those similarly
situated, the judgment of the lower Court should be reversed
and the Complaint dismissed as stating no cause of action with
Appellant awarded his costs.
Respectfully submitted tnis 20th

day of August

1976.

rmy^
ley for Appellant
l75lEast First North
i.ogan, Utan 84321
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,

I hereby certify tnat I mail^a eleven (11) copies
of tne foregoing brier of Appellant to the Utah Supreme Court
of Utah, two (2) copies to Plaintiff - Respondent•s attorney,
Dale M. Dorius, P. 0. Box 165, Brigham City, Utah H4302, this

2la

day of

(}^AAfi

1976.
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